The role of independent regulatory agencies in policy-making: a comparative analysis

This article examines the role of formally independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) in policy-making, focusing on six cases concerning the revision of crucial laws related to the competencies of the investigated IRA. These cases were selected from three small European countries (the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland) and two policy areas (finance and competition). After collecting documental and survey information on the participation and weight of each actor, the Actor-Process-Event Scheme was used to obtain a synthetic measure of agencies’ centrality in the course of each policy process. My hypotheses on the centrality of agencies are then tested with a two-step Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Results suggest that de facto independence from the political decision-makers is a necessary condition for the maximal centrality of agencies in policy-making, whilst non-professionalization of the legislature and low independence from the regulatees are jointly sufficient for explaining this outcome.

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