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Professional advice ∗

Robert E. Filman | Phillip C. Stocken | P. Sørensen | A. Lizzeri | R. Myerson | M. Ottaviani | R. Filman | Meg Meyer | Joel Sobel | Vincent Crawford | Eddie Dekel | Dilip Abreu | Murali Agastya | Ken Binmore | Tilman Börgers | Markus Brunnermeier | Thomas de Garidel-Thoron | Vijay Krishna | Marco LiCalzi | Massimo Marinacci | Steven Matthews | John Morgan | Stephen Morris | Eleanor O’Kee ﬀ e | Michele Polo | Andrea Prat | M. Marinacci | Markus K Brunnermeier | Massimo Marinacci | Stephen Morris

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