论文信息 - A GENERAL THEORY OF RATIONAL BEHAVIOR IN GAME SITUATIONS

A GENERAL THEORY OF RATIONAL BEHAVIOR IN GAME SITUATIONS

The von Neumann-Morgenstern theory of games does not yield determinate solutions (corresponding to unique payoff vectors) for two-person variable-sum games and for n-person games. The present paper outlines a general theory of rational behavior in game situations which does yield determinate solutions for all classes of games. The theory is based on two classes of rationality postulates: those defining rational behavior as'such, and those defining rational expectations concerning the other players' behavior. It is argued that this new approach greatly increases the possibilities for the application of game theory in economics and the other social sciences.

John C. Harsanyil

[1] F. Zeuthen. Problems of monopoly and economic warfare , 1930 .

[2] J. Nash. THE BARGAINING PROBLEM , 1950, Classics in Game Theory.

[3] J. Nash,et al. NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES , 1951, Classics in Game Theory.

[4] William Fellner,et al. Competition Among the Few. , 1952 .

[5] H. Raiffa. 21. Arbitration Schemes for Generalized Two-person Games , 1953 .

[6] John C. Harsanyi,et al. Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-taking , 1953, Journal of Political Economy.

[7] J. Nash. Two-Person Cooperative Games , 1953 .

[8] L. J. Savage,et al. The Foundations of Statistics , 1955 .

[9] T. Schelling. The Strategy of Conflict , 1963 .

[10] John C. Harsanyi,et al. On the rationality postulates underlying the theory of cooperative games , 1961 .

[11] John C. Harsanyi,et al. A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game , 1963 .