Equilibrium Analysis of Multi-Defender Security Games

Stackelberg game models of security have received much attention, with a number of approaches for computing Stackelberg equilibria in games with a single defender protecting a collection of targets. In contrast, multi-defender security games have received significantly less attention, particularly when each defender protects more than a single target. We fill this gap by considering a multidefender security game, with a focus on theoretical characterizations of equilibria and the price of anarchy. We present the analysis of three models of increasing generality, two in which each defender protects multiple targets. In all models, we find that the defenders often have the incentive to overprotect the targets, at times significantly. Additionally, in the simpler models, we find that the price of anarchy is unbounded, linearly increasing both in the number of defenders and the number of targets per defender. Surprisingly, when we consider a more general model, this results obtains only in a "corner" case in the space of parameters; in most cases, however, the price of anarchy converges to a constant when the number of defenders increases.

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