Information, the Cost of Credit, and Operational Efficiency: An Empirical Study of Microfinance

We provide direct evidence on the impact of asymmetric information on both financing and operating activities through a study of credit evaluations of microfinance institutions (MFIs). We employ a regression discontinuity model that exploits the eligibility criteria of an evaluation subsidy ofered by a nonprofit consortium. Evaluations dramatically cut the cost of financing. This efect is strongest for commercial lenders and for short-term MFI--lender relationships. The impact of evaluations on the supply of finance is mixed. Evaluated MFIs lend more efciently, extending more loans per employee. The Author 2010. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org., Oxford University Press.

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