Step Returns in Threshold Public Goods: A Meta- and Experimental Analysis

One important determinant of voluntary contributions to public goods is the value of the public good relative to that of the forgone private good. Isaac, Walker and Thomas (1984) formalized this relation in the Marginal Per Capita Return (MPCR) and demonstrated its influence on the provision of linear public goods. This paper develops a parallel concept, in the context of a threshold public good, the Step Return (SR). After providing a meta-analysis of the effect of SR in previous experiments, we compare contributions in threshold public goods games with low, medium and high SRs. Results show that subjects respond to the SR in this setting just as they respond to the MPCR in the linear public goods setting: higher SRs lead to more contributions.

[1]  P. Asch,et al.  Free riding with discrete and continuous public goods: Some experimental evidence , 1993 .

[2]  John Orbell,et al.  Organizing Groups for Collective Action , 1986, American Political Science Review.

[3]  Thomas R. Palfrey,et al.  Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information , 1991 .

[4]  张谷.  实验经济学（Experimental Economics）研究思路及成果应用简述 , 1994 .

[5]  Croson,et al.  Identifiability of Individual Contributions in a Threshold Public Goods Experiment. , 1998, Journal of mathematical psychology.

[6]  A. Rapoport,et al.  Provision of step-level public goods: Effects of greed and fear of being gypped , 1989 .

[7]  R. Mark Isaac,et al.  Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations , 1984 .

[8]  Gregory L. Poe,et al.  Voluntary revelation of the demand for public goods using a provision point mechanism , 1999 .

[9]  Ramzi Suleiman,et al.  Incremental Contribution in Step-Level Public Goods Games with Asymmetric Players , 1993 .

[10]  A. Rapoport,et al.  Provision of step‐level public goods with continuous contribution , 1992 .

[11]  A. Rapoport.  Provision of step-level public goods: effects of inequality in resources , 1988 .

[12]  H. Rosenthal,et al.  Repeated Play, Cooperation and Coordination: An Experimental Study , 1994 .

[13]  John Orbell,et al.  The Minimal Contributing Set as a Solution to Public Goods Problems , 1983, American Political Science Review.

[14]  Theo Offerman,et al.  Public good provision and public bad prevention: the effect of framing , 1998 .

[15]  J. Sonnemans,et al.  Value Orientations, Expectations and Voluntary Contributions in Public Goods. , 1996 .

[16]  Rachel Croson,et al.  The effect of recommended contributions in the voluntary provision of public goods , 2001 .

[17]  Michael McKee,et al.  Voluntary Contribution Games: Efficient Private Provision of Public Goods , 1991 .

[18]  Barton L. Lipman,et al.  Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions , 1989 .

[19]  Rachel Croson,et al.  The effect of recommended contributions in the voluntary provision of public goods , 2001 .

[20]  Rachel Croson,et al.  Alternative Rebate Rules in the Provision of a Threshold Public Good: An Experimental Investigation , 1998 .

[21]  C. Cadsby,et al.  Gender and free riding in a threshold public goods game: Experimental evidence , 1998 .

[22]  David Schmidtz,et al.  The assurance problem in a laboratory market , 1989 .

[23]  Rachel Croson,et al.  The effect of incomplete information in a threshold public goods experiment , 1999 .

[24]  H. Rosenthal,et al.  Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 With^ Funding from Testing Game-theoretic Models of Free Riding: New Evidence on Probability Bias and Learning , 2022 .

[25]  Ido Erev,et al.  Provision of Step-Level Public Goods , 1990 .

[26]  C. Cadsby,et al.  Choosing between a socially efficient and free-riding equilibrium: Nurses versus economics and business students , 1998 .

[27]  J. Andreoni.  IMPURE ALTRUISM AND DONATIONS TO PUBLIC GOODS: A THEORY OF WARM-GLOW GIVING* , 1990 .

[28]  Gregory L. Poe,et al.  The private provision of public goods: tests of a provision point mechanism for funding green power programs , 2002 .