Learning in Games

Abstract This essay discusses some recent work on `learning in games'. We explore non-equilibrium theories in which equilibrium emerges as the long-run outcome of a dynamic process of adjustment or learning. We focus on individual level models, and more specifically on variants of `fictitious play' in two-player games. We discuss both the theoretical properties of the models and their relationship to regularities observed in game theory experiments.

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