Cooperation in Small Groups - an Optimal Transport Approach

If agents cooperate only within small groups of some bounded sizes, is there a way to partition the population into small groups such that no collection of agents can do better by forming a new group? This paper revisited f-core in a transferable utility setting. By providing a new formulation to the problem, we built up a link between f-core and the transportation theory. Such a link helps us to establish an exact existence result, and a characterization result of f-core for a general class of agents, as well as some improvements in computing the f-core in the finite type case.

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