论文信息 - Executive budget proposal, executive veto, legislative override, and uncertainty: A comparative analysis of the budgetary process - 字舞流文

Executive budget proposal, executive veto, legislative override, and uncertainty: A comparative analysis of the budgetary process

Thomas A. Husted | J. Dearden

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