Adding possibilities can reduce the Gambler's Fallacy: A naïve-probability paradox

This paper reports a novel paradox of intuitive probabilistic reasoning detected in naïve reasoners’ responses in two separate experiments where we manipulated the number of sets (or possibilities) of the problem keeping constant the probability of the critical set. Experiment 1 showed that the incidence of the Gambler's Fallacy (GF) was reduced when the number of sets was increased. In Experiment 2, a reduction of the GF also occurred but, more importantly, the percentage of correct responses of the participants increased when three sets of possibilities instead of two were used. Therefore, both Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that an increase in the extensional complexity of a problem can, under certain circumstances, lead to facilitation. These results support the importance of the extensional features in solving chance problems and are consistent with the model theory of reasoning.

[1]  Peter Ayton,et al.  The hot hand fallacy and the gambler’s fallacy: Two faces of subjective randomness? , 2004, Memory & cognition.

[2]  Sandy Lovie How the mind works , 1980, Nature.

[3]  Ulrike Hahn,et al.  Perceptions of randomness: why three heads are better than four. , 2009, Psychological review.

[4]  P. Laplace A Philosophical Essay On Probabilities , 1902 .

[5]  Reid Hastie,et al.  Effects of Amount of Information on Judgment Accuracy and Confidence , 2008 .

[6]  P. Johnson-Laird Mental models and deduction , 2001, Trends in Cognitive Sciences.

[7]  D. M. Boynton,et al.  Superstitious responding and frequency matching in the positive bias and gambler’s fallacy effects , 2003 .

[8]  Daniel M. Oppenheimer,et al.  Overcoming intuition: metacognitive difficulty activates analytic reasoning. , 2007, Journal of experimental psychology. General.

[9]  Philip N. Johnson-Laird,et al.  Naive Probability: A Mental Model Theory of Extensional Reasoning , 1999 .

[10]  P. Johnson-Laird,et al.  Possibilities and Probabilities , 2003 .

[11]  A. Tversky,et al.  BELIEF IN THE LAW OF SMALL NUMBERS , 1971, Pediatrics.

[12]  A. Todorov,et al.  The illusion of knowledge: When more information reduces accuracy and increases confidence , 2007 .

[13]  G. S. Tune RESPONSE PREFERENCES: A REVIEW OF SOME RELEVANT LITERATURE. , 1964, Psychological bulletin.

[14]  L. Macchi,et al.  Thinking : psychological perspectives on reasoning, judgment and decision making , 2005 .

[15]  D. Krantz,et al.  The use of statistical heuristics in everyday inductive reasoning , 1983 .