Democracy, Disputes, and Negotiated Settlements

The argument that democracies are less belligerent toward one another because of their experience with mediation, negotiation, and compromise at the domestic level suggests that negotiated dispute settlements are more likely between relatively democratic states than other conflicting pairs. Militarized Interstate Dispute data and Polity IIId and Freedom House ratings of democracy are used to examine the propensities of disputants to resolve their grievances through negotiated means. Findings suggest a strong positive influence for mutual democracy. Specifically, the more democratic the less democratic member of a conflictual dyad, the more likely it is their dispute will be resolved through a negotiated settlement. This finding also holds across varying degrees of dyadic relative power and supports existing literature that chronicles the pacific conditioning power of democratic norms for several areas of interstate relations.

[1]  L. Cederman Back to Kant: Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace as a Macrohistorical Learning Process , 2001, American Political Science Review.

[2]  William R. Thompson,et al.  A Tale of Two Democratic Peace Critiques , 1997 .

[3]  Jacob Bercovitch,et al.  Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations , 1991 .

[4]  Erik Gartzke,et al.  Political System Similarity And The Choice of Allies , 1996 .

[5]  Paul D. Senese,et al.  Geographical Proximity and Issue Salience: Their Effects on the Escalation of Militarized Interstate Conflict , 1996 .

[6]  N. P. Gleditsch,et al.  Timing the Changes in Political Structures , 1998 .

[7]  Jason Wittenberg,et al.  Making the Most Of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation , 2000 .

[8]  R. Gastil,et al.  The Comparative Survey of Freedom: Experiences and Suggestions , 1990 .

[9]  S. Bremer Dangerous Dyads , 1992 .

[10]  David A. Lake Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War , 1992, American Political Science Review.

[11]  Curtis S. Signorino Strategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of International Conflict , 1999, American Political Science Review.

[12]  Randolph M. Siverson,et al.  Birds of a Feather , 1991 .

[13]  Dan Reiter,et al.  Democracy, Political Similarity, and International Alliances, 1816-1992 , 2000 .

[14]  J. Singer Reconstructing the correlates of war dataset on material capabilities of states, 1816–1985 , 1988 .

[15]  Zeev Maoz,et al.  The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict, 1950-85 , 1996 .

[16]  Randolph M. Siverson,et al.  An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace , 1999, American Political Science Review.

[17]  Bruce Russett,et al.  Is the Liberal Peace Just an Artifact of Cold War , 1999 .

[18]  J. Ray The Democratic Path to Peace , 1997 .

[19]  Erik Gartzke,et al.  Preferences and the Democratic Peace , 2000 .

[20]  Stuart A. Bremer,et al.  Democracy and militarized interstate conflict, 1816–1965 , 1993 .

[21]  Lars-Erik Cederman,et al.  Exploring the Dynamics of the Democratic Peace , 2001 .

[22]  Henry S. Farber,et al.  Polities and Peace , 1995 .

[23]  T. D. Mason,et al.  How Civil Wars End , 1996 .

[24]  T. Vanhanen A New Dataset for Measuring Democracy, 1810-1998 , 2000 .

[25]  James Burk,et al.  Ballots and Bullets , 1999 .

[26]  M. Mousseau Democracy and Compromise in Militarized Interstate Conflicts, 1816-1992 , 1998 .

[27]  Gregory A. Raymond Democracies, Disputes, and Third-Party Intermediaries , 1994 .

[28]  Hugh Miall,et al.  The Peacemakers: Peaceful Settlement of Disputes since 1945 , 1992 .

[29]  Curtis S. Signorino,et al.  Tau-b or Not Tau-b: Measuring the Similarity of Foreign Policy Positions , 1999 .

[30]  P. Senese Democracy and Maturity: Deciphering Conditional Effects on Levels of Dispute Intensity , 1999 .

[31]  Michael D. Ward,et al.  Double Take , 1997 .

[32]  J. O'neal,et al.  The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950–1985 , 1997 .

[33]  A. Stam,et al.  Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory , 1998, American Political Science Review.

[34]  Kenneth A. Bollen,et al.  Issues in the Comparative Measurement of Political Democracy , 1980 .

[35]  Will H. Moore,et al.  The Transformation of the Western State: The Growth of Democracy, Autocracy, and State Power Since 1800 , 1990 .

[36]  Common Interests or Common Polities? Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace , 1995 .

[37]  W. J. Dixon Third-party techniques for preventing conflict escalation and promoting peaceful settlement , 1996, International Organization.

[38]  Erik Gartzke,et al.  Kant We All Just get Along? Opportunity, Willingness, and the Origins of the Democratic Peace , 1998 .

[39]  Peter J. Partell Escalation at the outset: An analysis of targets’ responses in militarized interstate disputes , 1997 .

[40]  R. B. Russell Intervention and Negotiation: The United States and the Dominican Revolution. , 1970, American Journal of International Law.

[41]  John A. Vasquez The War Puzzle: PRELIMINARIES , 1993 .

[42]  Murray Wolfson The political economy of war and peace , 1998 .

[43]  Allan C. Stam,et al.  Win, Lose, or Draw: Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War , 1996 .

[44]  Kenneth A. Bollen,et al.  Liberal Democracy: Validity and Method Factors in Cross-National Measures , 1993 .

[45]  S. Weart Never at War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Another , 1998 .

[46]  R. Rummel Understanding Conflict and War , 1975 .

[47]  Michael W. Doyle,et al.  Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs , 1997 .

[48]  Bruce Russett,et al.  Grasping the Democratic Peace , 1994 .

[49]  P. Senese Between Dispute and War: The Effect of Joint Democracy on Interstate Conflict Escalation , 1997, The Journal of Politics.

[50]  Abraham F. Lowenthal The Dominican intervention , 1972 .

[51]  William J. Dixon,et al.  Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict , 1994, American Political Science Review.

[52]  J. David Singer,et al.  Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816–1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns , 1996 .

[53]  D. Scott Bennett,et al.  Eugene: A conceptual manual , 2000 .

[54]  Z. Maoz,et al.  Realist and Cultural Critiques of the Democratic Peace: A Theoretical and Empirical Reassessment , 1998 .

[55]  William J. Dixon,et al.  Democracy and the Management of International Conflict , 1993 .

[56]  Håvard Hegre,et al.  Development and the Liberal Peace: What Does it Take to be a Trading State? , 2000 .

[57]  Democracy and International Conflict , 1995 .

[58]  Zeev Maoz,et al.  Alliance, contiguity, wealth, and political stability: Is the lack of conflict among democracies a statistical artifact? 1 , 1992 .

[59]  B. Russett,et al.  The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885–1992 , 1999, World Politics.

[60]  Ted Robert Gurr,et al.  Transitions to Democracy: Tracking Democracy''s Third Wave with the Polity III Data , 1996 .

[61]  L. R. Reed,et al.  A unified statistical model of conflict onset and escalation American Journal of Political Science 4 , 2000 .

[62]  B. Russett,et al.  Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations , 2000 .

[63]  Ronald R. Krebs Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict , 1999, International Organization.

[64]  P. Diehl Contiguity and Military Escalation in Major Power Rivalries, 1816-1980 , 1985, The Journal of Politics.

[65]  M. Mousseau Market Prosperity, Democratic Consolidation, and Democratic Peace , 2000 .

[66]  Alastair Smith,et al.  Testing theories of strategic choice: The example of crisis escalation , 1999 .

[67]  Jason Wittenberg,et al.  Clarify: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results , 2003 .

[68]  W. Reed,et al.  The Relevance of Politically Relevant Dyads , 2001 .

[69]  Nathaniel Beck,et al.  Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable , 1998 .