PEVS: A Secure Electronic Voting Scheme Using Polling Booths

We present a Polling booth based Electronic Voting Scheme (PEVS) that allows eligible voters to cast their ballots inside polling booths. The ballot cast by a voter is inalterable and non-reusable. The scheme ensures vote-privacy since there is no link between the voter and the keys used for voting. A voter computer inside the booth performs the cryptographic task to construct the ballot to provide receipt-freeness. The scheme is coercion-resistant and modeled to fend off forced-abstention attacks, simulation attacks or randomization attacks. In addition, the scheme is both voter and universal verifiable. We formally analyze soundness (the eligibility of the voter, inalterability and non-reusability of the ballot), vote-privacy, receipt-freeness, and coercion-resistance in PEVS using the ProVerif tool. The analysis shows that PEVS satisfies these required properties. PEVS is the first polling booth based electronic voting scheme that satisfies all the requirements listed.

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