The auction mechanism research with objective of maximizing the social efficiency

According to most existing auction mechanism paying great attention to the study of benefit maximization, being oblivious to the auction mechanism for the breadth of the influence of resource allocation, and to some extent, it restricted the resources promotion during the participants. This paper introduces a design to achieve the objective of maximizing the volume of the auction mechanism. It not only considers the resources distribution in the breadth but also imports the concept of time, guaranteeing participants of the mechanism in each period achieving hoping trade deals and the mechanism of the maximum number of transactions. In this mechanism we designed a largest-matching-algorithm. The buyers and sellers are converted into bipartite graph vertices, trade relations are expressed in undirected edges , and finally the largest amount of matching are calculated; Examples show that the method designed in this paper can effectively achieve the distribution of the maximum volume.

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