Corrupt organizations: modeling educators’ misconduct with cellular automata

Misconduct in education is a serious problem internationally. Corruption and other forms of misconduct may be modeled in large educational organizations with strong vertical and horizontal ties with the help of cellular automata. This paper offers a theoretical framework and a methodology based on cellular automata to study corruption in large educational organizations, including school districts and state and private university and college systems. Cellular automaton allows making forecasts, assessments, and predictions about the scope and scale of corruption within organizations. Starting with different cases or combinations of behavior on the workplace and working environment as initial conditions, the process of cellular automation simulates behavior of educators and results in images that depict likely future developments in educators’ misconduct within educational organizations. The results of simulations reflect patterns of academic, financial, and administrative misconduct that may be found in academia.

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