Usability Considerations For Coercion-Resistant Election Systems

Coercion is an inherent problem of any Internet election. Because voters can vote from any connected place and there is no voting booth to protect them while voting, coercers can easily force them to select their candidates. Although there is no optimal solution for this problem, modern Internet election systems can mitigate it. In other words, these system usually allow voters under coercion to deceive adversaries by casting fake votes. When in safe, voters can vote again; this time, for their legitimate candidates. This idea helps voters to fight coercive attacks. However, these systems require additional actions from the voters that may have problems to perform them correctly. In particular, voters under coercion can have problems to defeat coercive attacks by means of fake votes. In this work, we investigate usability issues with regards the voter action when interacting with coercion-resistant election systems. In order to accomplish this and trying to balance usability and security, we performed a set of usability tests using one of these systems as a case study. This system is based on one of the most efficients cryptographic protocols available. Our results show usability problems that might appear when using these systems in realistic elections. In addition, we present recommendations that can help to design more user friendly coercion-resistant systems.

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