论文信息 - Telling the truth may not pay off: an empirical study of centralised university admissions in Germany - 字舞流文

Telling the truth may not pay off: an empirical study of centralised university admissions in Germany

Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft

[1] Parag A. Pathak,et al. Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match , 2009 .

[2] Wolfgang Karl Härdle,et al. A generalized ARFIMA process with Markov-switching fractional differencing parameter , 2007 .

[3] Yan Chen,et al. School Choice : An Experimental Study ∗ , 2004 .

[4] Parag A. Pathak,et al. Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism , 2006 .

[5] Tayfun Sönmez,et al. Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism , 2006 .

[6] Parag A. Pathak,et al. The New York City High School Match , 2005 .

[7] Richard J. Zeckhauser,et al. The Early Admissions Game: Joining the Elite , 2004 .

[8] M. Balinski,et al. A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement , 1999 .

[9] José Alcalde,et al. Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems , 1994 .

[10] A. Roth. A natural experiment in the organization of entry-level labor markets: regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the United Kingdom. , 1991, The American economic review.

[11] Alvin E. Roth,et al. Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis , 1990 .

[12] A. Roth. The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem , 1985 .

[13] Alvin E. Roth,et al. The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives , 1982, Math. Oper. Res..