Adaptivity and Anticipation in Expert-Laypeople Communication

Communication between experts and laypeople has become an almost ubiquitous phenomenon. However, this dimension has been neglected in psychological research on expertise where the expert usually is modeled as an isolated problem solver. The present paper argues that in particular the expertOs specialized knowledge often proves to be an obstacle to effective interpersonal communication with laypersons. The theoretical discussion of the notion of community membership (Clark and Marshall 1992) shows that it is a necessary but complex demand for experts to take a laypersonOs perspective in order to establish common ground. In an empirical study with two types of computer experts it was investigated in how far experts are able to anticipate what laypersons know about their domain. A second study analyzed how different aspects of knowledge are differently considered by expert architects when adapting to a lay audience. There are numerous situations in everyday life in which one must rely on specialized knowledge provided by experts. Hence, expert-layperson communication has become an almost ubiquitous phenomenon. However, sometimes specialized knowledge becomes an obstacle to effective communication with laypeople. It is more than just a clichŽ to say that there is a certain type of Oblind expertO. Despite his or her skilled professional performance this type of expert strikingly fails as soon as he/she is asked to explain how he/she managed to solve oneOs problem. Traditional research on expertise has yielded important insights into the cognitive basis of expert performance in complex domains (Boshuizen and van de Wiel 1998, Bromme 1992, Chi, Glaser, and Farr 1988, Ericsson and Smith 1991, Evans and Patel 1992, Hoffman 1992). A rich and differentiated knowledge base, including multiple representations of problems and a categorical perception OsoakedO with experience, enables a rapid conceptualization of problems and the activation of routine problem solving strategies. In this research tradition, high performance experts are typically compared with novices and intermediates while the knowledge base under study is confined to the problem domain, i.e. a certain field of expertise. Hence, the knowledge base required for communication and cooperation is not studied, instead the expert is rather construed as a OlonelyO problem solver. When OexpertO is understood as OprofessionalO (cf. Bromme and Tillema 1995, for commonalities and differences of both concepts) and when their interaction with laypersons (or with experts from other domains) is examined, the question arises which additional knowledge and skills are necessary to cope with the task demand of cooperation and communication and how this additional knowledge is related to the domain-knowledge. We have set up a research program to investigate such questions. We are especially interested in communication between experts and laypeople and in communication within interdisciplinary work-settings (http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/inst3/ AEbromme). At present, we focus in particular on the analysis of expertsO ability to anticipate a laypersonOs perspective for communicative purposes. We propose that the study of such anticipations is an important step to learn more about the nature of the OadditionalO expert knowledge needed for successful communication with laypersons.

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