FUTURE NAVAL CONTINGENCY AND LIMITED WAR OPERATIONS
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The world has changed dramatically in the past few years. In large part, many of the changes have been driven by the emphasis now given to contingency and limited war operations. Navy leadership even coined a special term for them late in the 1980s: CALOW (Contingency and Limited Objective Warfare). As a result, naval planning has also changed, and with it so have the demands upon naval engineering. This paper addresses some of the factors that are now shaping naval planning. Characteristics of contingency and limited war operations are presented. Their implications for naval planning, for naval systems, for concepts of employment, and for naval force structure are examined. It is important that both Navy leadership and the naval engineering community understand these implications fully so that they may respond to them appropriately. The specific value of this paper lies in its synthesis of information so that the naval engineering community may appreciate the full impact of future contingency and limited war operations.
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