Abstract The most common notion of environmental tax reform (ETR) is the use of the revenue from environmental taxes to reduce distortionary labour taxes. The PETRAS project 1 has shown that there are a number of social and political impediments to implementing such reform. This paper firstly outlines some of the environmental and economic implications of environmental taxes generally. It goes on to explore three broad approaches to ETR, based on the allocation of the tax revenues, and explores the environmental and economic implications of each approach and the likelihood of political and social acceptance. Particular attention is paid to reducing regressive impacts and impacts on competitiveness. It is concluded that some combination of earmarking a proportion of revenues to environmental projects and diverting rest to reduce labour taxes is probably the best approach in light of the results of the project. The balance should depend upon local labour market and macroeconomic conditions, the extent to which environmental projects are already funded and the extent of government failure, i.e., the problems of resource allocation that occur as a result of government intervention in markets. Funding should only be provided to environmental projects if it can be shown that, in themselves, they are economically efficient. In addition, it is most important that a proportion of the funds be used to ameliorate any regressive impacts. It is also important to bear in mind that hypothecation or recycling of revenue is not the same as a tax shift, which is a reform of the entire system, so some of these approaches may take away from the integrity of ETR. The paper concludes with some of the initiatives that are likely to be necessary to facilitate social and political acceptance of this approach to ETR.
[1]
Nuclear Safety.
Database on environmental taxes in the European Union member states, plus Norway and Switzerland : evaluation of environmental effects of environmental taxes
,
1999
.
[2]
J. Peter Clinch,et al.
Domestic energy efficiency in ireland: correcting market failure
,
2000
.
[3]
Leo Schrattenholzer,et al.
Estimating the costs of mitigating greenhouse gases
,
1996
.
[4]
Stephen H. Schneider,et al.
Induced technological change and the attractiveness of CO2 abatement policies
,
1999
.
[5]
Benoît Bosquet,et al.
Environmental tax reform: does it work? A survey of the empirical evidence
,
2000
.
[6]
Stefan Bach,et al.
Modellgestützte Analyse der ökologischen Steuerreform mit LEAN, PANTA RHEI: und dem Potsdamer Mikrosimulationsmodell
,
2001
.
[7]
G. Watts,et al.
Climate Change 1995
,
1998
.
[8]
A. Baranzini,et al.
A future for carbon taxes
,
2000
.
[9]
M. Porter,et al.
Toward a New Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship
,
1995
.
[10]
P. Nijkamp,et al.
Environmental tax reform and double dividend
,
2002
.
[11]
V. Linderhof.
Household demand for energy, water and the collection of waste
,
2001
.
[12]
T. Rutherford,et al.
Carbon Taxes with Exemptions in an Open Economy: A General Equilibrium Analysis of the German Tax Initiative
,
1997
.
[13]
D. Fullerton,et al.
Environmental Taxes and the Double-Dividend Hypothesis: Did You Really Expect Something for Nothing?
,
1997
.