Management control of interfirm transactional relationships: the case of industrial renovation and maintenance - Design and methods

Abstract This paper is focused on the way in which interfirm relations can be drawn up and controlled. Drawing on contracting theories a model is built of the management control structure of interfirm relationships. The model consists of three control patterns and of contingency factors that influence the choices between the patterns. Particular attention is paid to the role of trust. In building our model we take the perspective of the outsourcer. We try to refine our model by conducting case research in the field of industrial renovation and industrial maintenance. In this field we observed changes in the way outsourcing relationships are controlled. Case research can be very helpful for gaining insights into factors that influence the establishment of control structures of interfirm relationships. By comparing the results of our case research we found institutional, strategic, cultural and historical factors to be of great importance for these control structures.

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