How hard is it to control an election? Math

Some voting schemes that are in principle susceptible to control are nevertheless resistant in practice due to excessive computational costs; others are vulnerable. We illustrate this in detail for plurality voting and for Condorcet voting.

[1]  Charles R. Plott,et al.  Axiomatic Social Choice Theory: An Overview and Interpretation , 1976 .

[2]  M. Trick,et al.  The computational difficulty of manipulating an election , 1989 .

[3]  Craig A. Tovey,et al.  Recognizing majority-rule equilibrium in spatial voting games , 1991 .

[4]  L. Moser,et al.  The Theory of Round Robin Tournaments , 1966 .

[5]  Nicholas R. Miller.  A New Solution Set for Tournaments and Majority Voting: Further Graph- Theoretical Approaches to the Theory of Voting , 1980 .

[6]  Hannu Nurmi,et al.  On the strategic properties of some modern methods of group decision making , 1984 .

[7]  M. Trick,et al.  Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election , 1989 .

[8]  Jerry S. Kelly,et al.  Social Choice Theory: An Introduction , 1988 .

[9]  Thomas O. Jukam,et al.  Discontent and Aggressive Political Participation , 1983, British Journal of Political Science.

[10]  John J. Bartholdi,et al.  Single transferable vote resists strategic voting , 2015 .

[11]  David S. Johnson,et al.  Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness , 1978 .

[12]  H. Nurmi.  Voting Procedures: A Summary Analysis , 1983, British Journal of Political Science.

[13]  Whitfield Diffie,et al.  New Directions in Cryptography , 1976, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory.

[14]  C. Plott.  PATH INDEPENDENCE, RATIONALITY, AND SOCIAL CHOICE , 1973 .

[15]  J. Banks.  Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control , 1984 .