论文信息 - Stable Winning Coalitions

Stable Winning Coalitions

We introduce the notion of a stable winning coalition in a multiplayer game as a new system of classification of games. An axiomatic refinement of this classification for three-player games is also presented. These classifications are compared in light of a probabilistic model and the existing literature.

Daniel E. Loeb | D. Loeb

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