COMPUTER-SUPPORTED COLLABORATIVE NEGOTIATION METHODOLOGY

The development of large-scale civil engineering projects requires the collaboration of experts from different specialties. However, conflicts and disputes occur regularly during the entire life cycle of large-scale projects due to the complex structure of organization and the different types of expertise involved. If these disputes or conflicts cannot be resolved or addressed quickly and effectively, the collaborative mode of the participants can be affected, creating a hostile environment in which progress of the project will slow to a halt. Therefore, better methodologies are needed to improve the collaborative process and to create more effective, efficient, and sustainable solutions to conflicts. This paper presents a methodology for facilitating the negotiation of conflicts during large-scale civil engineering projects. Two fundamental theories are used in this methodology: (1) game theory, which is the study of players’ actions based on the premise that the decision of any player can affect the payoff of all players; and (2) negotiation theory, which is the study of the interactions between parties, designed to reconcile their differences and produce a settlement. The strong support given by these two theories to negotiators is highlighted in the following observations. First, people need to negotiate because of their conflicting interests. From the negotiator’s point of view, expressing the interests of all participants is very important in conflict resolution and can be accomplished by following the principles outlined in negotiation theory. Once the interests have been expressed correctly, the influence of positions or of conflicting interests on the overall negotiation outcome is evaluated using game theory. Based on these two fundamental theories, this paper presents a collaborative negotiation methodology and a computer agent named CONVINCER which incorporates that methodology to facilitate or mediate the negotiation of conflicts in large-scale civil engineering projects. Hypothetical case studies demonstrate the effectiveness of CONVINCER agent in conflict resolution. Results of applying the methodology to different scenarios have shown that the CONVINCER provides efficient, effective, and sustainable solutions, thus improving the conflict resolution paradigm in the A/E/C industry.

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