论文信息 - On the dynamics of asymmetric games

On the dynamics of asymmetric games

A game dynamical analysis of a simple asymmetric game (two roles with two alternatives each) shows that an interesting class of “semi-stable” heteroclinic cycles leading to a highly unpredictable behaviour can occur in a robust way. Biological examples related to conflicts over ownership and parental investment are analysed.

[1] P. Taylor,et al. Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics , 1978 .

[2] M. Kimura,et al. An introduction to population genetics theory , 1971 .

[3] R. Cressman,et al. Strong stability and evolutionarily stable strategies with two types of players , 1991 .

[4] John Maynard Smith,et al. The logic of asymmetric contests , 1976, Animal Behaviour.

[5] M. Farkas. Zip bifurcation in a competition model , 1984 .

[6] John Maynard Smith,et al. Evolution and the Theory of Games: Preface , 1982 .

[7] J M Smith,et al. Evolution and the theory of games , 1976 .

[8] Josef Hofbauer,et al. The theory of evolution and dynamical systems , 1988 .

[9] P. Hammerstein. The role of asymmetries in animal contests , 1981, Animal Behaviour.

[10] P. Schuster,et al. Coyness, philandering and stable strategies , 1981, Animal Behaviour.

[11] R. Gardner,et al. The evolution of bluffing in animal contests: an ESS approach , 1989 .

[12] R. Selten. A note on evolutionarily stable strategies in asymmetric animal conflicts. , 1980, Journal of theoretical biology.