Abstract : The end of major combat operations in Iraq in 2003 was merely the beginning of a different fight, one in which an unconventional weapon has had a deadly impact on conventional forces. The Improvised Explosive Device (IED) has proven to be the number one threat to Coalition Forces in Iraq and now in Afghanistan. In response to this relatively cheap and somewhat unsophisticated killer, the Department of Defense (DoD) has invested billions of dollars and established a large organization with one goal: to defeat IEDs. The Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) has had some success in this mission, but the use of IEDs persists. Because of the resources invested in JIEDDO and the urgency of its charge, it is important to assess the entity as it stands today and consider its role for the future. Therefore, the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations conducted this study to answer two questions: (1) Is JIEDDO winning the Counter-IED (C-IED) fight in Iraq and Afghanistan? and (2) What is the Department's long-term plan for JIEDDO and for addressing other asymmetric threats? JIEDDO's actions and activities fall under three lines of operation: (1) Defeat the Device, (2) Attack the Network, and (3) Train the Force. The primary focus of the Defeat the Device effort is on neutralizing the IED after it is emplaced. This includes funding the development of technical and nontechnical countermeasures and the ability to rapidly field new equipment. Attack the Network activities aim to find and eliminate bomb makers and their supporters before they can assemble and emplace IEDs. The C-IED Operations Integration Center is the primary enabler for attacking IED networks. The Joint Center of Excellence supports training for U.S. personnel on how to protect themselves from IEDs. Although JIEDDO spends more than $4 billion annually under these three lines of operation, this study concludes that it is not clear how well the organization is accomplishing its mission.