I was delighted to read Mark Rollins’ review and reflection on my book, Image and Brain (1994), for two reasons: First, this is a wonderful example of ways in which philosophers can help laboratory scientists. They not only can sweep away cobwebs of "conceptual confusion," but – at least as important – can suggest testable hypotheses. Rollins has done a bit of both in his review. Second, Rollins has deeply understood the central thrust of my project; I only wish I could explain it so clearly and succinctly myself. I am flattered that he has taken the time to understand it so well, and grateful for his kind words. But of course, Rollins doesn’t agree with all that I wrote, and argues that there are two major problems with my theory and approach. The first is that the “particulars of perceptual strategy might be false.” The second is that the variability that arises from my emphasis on strategy "poses a prima facie threat to explanation." In addition, Rollins suggests another perspective on the issue of format (i.e., the type of code) used in imagery. Let me consider each topic in turn.
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