Values Are a Good Thing in Conservation Biology

One of the most hotly contested issues in ecology and conservation biology is about whether, or to what degree, scientists should be involved as advocates in public policy debates. Although the conventional wisdom has been to maintain a “healthy distance” between science and policy, this view is increasingly challenged by natural scientists, sociologists, and philosophers of science. Like many scientists, I developed an intense interest in natural history early in childhood. I also witnessed the destruction of my favorite childhood places by developers who seemed completely callous to the beauty of these places and to the lives of the plants and animals, which they ended. This destruction and the attitude behind it filled me with sorrow and rage. I vowed that I would learn as much as I could about these creatures and places that I loved and use that knowledge to help defend them. I believe it is crucial for each of us to recognize the extent to which we are shaped by our preferences and experiences. Too few scientists openly acknowledge experiential and emotional factors that attracted them to their science in the first place. We are loathe to confess our biases. Personal bias will determine to a great extent what we choose to study, how we interpret the results, and to what extent we advocate particular policies or actions. If we allow our biases to get control of us, to the extent that we seek out data to support preconceived conclusions, selectively cite literature that agrees with our conclusions, ignore conflicting evidence, become dogmatic in our opinions and preferences, or—worst of all— fabricate or alter data to support our case, then we have gone too far, and we deserve every bit of scorn and distrust our scientific colleagues and society at large may heap on us. Yet, if we can be inspired by our positive values—life, truth, fairness, and the standards and professional norms of science—then we can be honest advocates. The key to honest advocacy is the willingness to question our own assumptions and change our opinions when compelling evidence suggests we should. Robertson and Hull (2001:972) clearly posed the problem: “Post-positivist sci-