论文信息 - Coalitional fairness and distortion of utilities

Coalitional fairness and distortion of utilities

The author considers the noncooperative game with strategies consisting of utility functions and whose outcomes are coalitionally fair solutions for the case of a finite number of agents who wish to divide a finite number of commodities. It is shown that for such a game any equal-income competitive equilibrium allocation for the true utilities is a Nash equilibrium outcome. >

Somdeb Lahiri | S. Lahiri

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