Who is in whose pocket? Director compensation, board independence, and barriers to effective monitoring

Abstract We use a bargaining framework to examine empirically the relations between director compensation and board-of-director independence. Our evidence suggests that independent directors have a bargaining advantage over the CEO that results in compensation more closely aligned with shareholders’ objectives. Firms with more outsiders on their boards award directors more equity-based compensation. When the CEO's power over the board increases, compensation provides weaker incentives to monitor. Firms with more inside directors and with entrenched CEOs use less equity-based pay. Furthermore, firms with entrenched CEOs and CEOs who also chair the board are less likely to replace cash pay with equity.

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