论文信息 - A Zero-Sum Game with Incomplete Information and Compact Action Spaces

A Zero-Sum Game with Incomplete Information and Compact Action Spaces

We make use of distributional strategies to describe player's choices of actions in a zero-sum game with incomplete information and compact action spaces. Under very mild assumptions we obtain the existence of equilibria.

Kenneth Schilling | John W. Mamer

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