Reputation From a Game Theoretic Point of View

This paper provides a general game theoretic framework to analyze reputation. The aim of this paper is to show the value added by a game theoretic approach to informal analysis of reputation. This object is pursued first through an exemplification of the contribution of game theory to the understanding of reputation, then explaining the formal mathematical machinery used to understand the way of building reputation. In particular I will develop an extensive analysis of three simple cases to show how the game theoretic approach to reputation works and its possible application to academic institutions. I conclude comparing the answers provided by game theory to open question in the analysis of reputation and showing how game theory stress subtle aspects of the way reputation is built and works. JEL: C72, D83, D82

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