Game Theoretical Analysis of a Multi-MNO MVNO Business Model in 5G Networks

This paper analyzes the economic feasibility of a business model for multi-Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) and Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs), which is an envisioned scenario in mobile telecommunications markets supported by 5G networks. A business model for the provision of service to end-users through an MVNO using the infrastructure support of two MNOs is proposed. We analyze the proposal though a model that captures both system and economic features. As regards the systems features, an MVNO provides service to final users using the infrastructure support of two MNOs. The agreement between MVNO and MNOs is such that the MVNO will split the network traffic between the two MNOs and will pay to each MNO for the traffic served through its infrastructure. As regards the economic features, the incentives are modelled through the user utilities and the operators’ profits; and game theory is used to model the strategic interaction between the users’ subscription decision and the MNO network capacities decision. We conclude that such a model is feasible from an economic point of view for all the actors.

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