论文信息 - Justification of the simple majority and chairman rules

Justification of the simple majority and chairman rules

Employing the uncertain dichotomous model, this work proves the optimality of the simple majority and the chairman rules under complete ignorance of the decision competencies of the decision makers.The optimality of these commonly used rules is also retained under certain patterns of partial information on the characteristics of the distribution of the members' competencies.

Drora Karotkin | Drora Karotkin

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