Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources

A one-dimensional model of two candidate elections under asymmetric information is theoretically developed and experimentally tested. Candidates do not know voter utility functions, and most voters are uninformed about candidate policy positions. A fulfilled expectations equilibrium is defined, using poll and endorsement data as information sources. It is proved that with any positive fraction of informed voters, any equilibrium extracts all available information: all participants—voters and candidates alike—act as if they were fully informed. For fixed candidate strategies, a dynamic is given for convergence to voter equilibrium, and this process is shown to imply a “bandwagon effect.”

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