Reform and renewables in China: The architecture of Yunnan's hydropower dominated electricity market

Reforms currently under way in China's electricity markets bear important implications for its decarbonization objectives. The southwestern province of Yunnan is among the provinces piloting the current iteration of power market reforms. As such, lessons from Yunnan will inform future market reform and renewable energy policies in China and potentially elsewhere. The dominance of hydropower in Yunnan's energy portfolio and the particular transmission constraints it faces, offer an interesting case study of the challenges of decarbonization. We report on market architecture reforms and aggregate market data collected from the Yunnan Power Exchange. We review four elements in the reformed market architecture. Market pricing rules, transitional quantity controls, the generation rights market, and inter-provincial trade. The specifics of market reform reflect a compromise between decarbonization, inter-provincial competition, grid security and development objectives and contribute to understanding of how the dual transitions of hydropower decarbonization and market liberalization interact. We conclude on six insights regarding the role of the grid operator, security checks on trade, integration of cascade hydropower, the inclusion of renewables in the generation rights market, price controls, and market participant price uncertainty.

[1]  Why Regulate Utilities? , 1968, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[2]  Sufang Zhang,et al.  To what extent will China's ongoing electricity market reforms assist the integration of renewable energy? , 2018 .

[3]  Yinfang Zhang,et al.  The Regulatory Framework and Sustainable Development of China's Electricity Sector* , 2015, The China Quarterly.

[4]  Chung-Min Tsai The Reform Paradox and Regulatory Dilemma in China's Electricity Industry , 2011 .

[5]  Jinlong Ma On-grid electricity tariffs in China: Development, reform and prospects , 2011 .

[6]  Oliver Kerr,et al.  The Paris Agreement: China’s ‘New Normal’ role in international climate negotiations , 2017, Climate Policy after the 2015 Paris Climate Conference.

[7]  E. Handschin,et al.  Modeling of the Generalized Unified Power Flow Controller (GUPFC) in a Nonlinear Interior Point OPF , 2001, IEEE Power Engineering Review.

[8]  Thomas C. Heller,et al.  Reform of the Chinese Electric Power Market: Economics and Institutions , 2006 .

[9]  Stephen Dow,et al.  The Ongoing Reforms to China's Government and State Sector: The case of the energy industry , 2000 .

[10]  Jingzheng Ren,et al.  The Dragon awakens: Innovation, competition, and transition in the energy strategy of the People’s Republic of China, 1949–2017 , 2017 .

[11]  Ling Chen PLAYING THE MARKET REFORM CARD: THE CHANGING PATTERNS OF POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN CHINA'S ELECTRIC POWER SECTOR , 2010, The China Journal.

[12]  Zeng Ming,et al.  Review on transaction status and relevant policies of southern route in China's West–East Power Transmission , 2013 .

[13]  Modeling Unit Commitment in Political Context: Case of China's Partially Restructured Electricity Sector , 2017 .

[14]  Limin Du,et al.  Assessing the impact of regulatory reforms on China's electricity generation industry , 2009 .

[15]  James H. Williams,et al.  Electricity reform and sustainable development in China , 2008 .

[16]  Kaveh Madani,et al.  A game theory-reinforcement learning (GT-RL) method to develop optimal operation policies for multi-operator reservoir systems , 2014 .

[17]  M. Zeng,et al.  Coordination between clean energy generation and thermal power generation under the policy of “direct power-purchase for large users” in China , 2015 .

[18]  ZhongXiang Zhang Assessing China’s carbon intensity pledge for 2020: stringency and credibility issues and their implications , 2011 .

[19]  Feng Wang,et al.  China's Renewable Energy Policy: Commitments and Challenges , 2010 .

[20]  Wenying Chen,et al.  The reform of electricity power sector in the PR of China , 2006 .

[21]  H. Ngan Electricity regulation and electricity market reforms in China , 2010 .

[22]  Q Zhang,et al.  Overall review of feed-in tariff and renewable portfolio standard policy: A perspective of China , 2016 .

[23]  D. MacKenzie,et al.  The use of knowledge about society , 2008 .

[24]  M. Zeng,et al.  The power industry reform in China 2015: Policies, evaluations and solutions , 2016 .

[25]  P. Andrews-Speed Chapter 18 – Reform Postponed: The Evolution of China’s Electricity Markets , 2013 .

[26]  Fereidoon P. Sioshansi,et al.  Electricity market reform: What has the experience taught us thus far?☆ , 2006 .

[27]  O. Williamson,et al.  Transaction Cost Economics , 1995 .

[28]  The relationship between regulation and contracts in infrastructure industries: Regulation as ordered renegotiation , 2012 .

[29]  T. Hennig,et al.  Shades of green energy: Geographies of small hydropower in Yunnan, China and the challenges of over-development , 2018 .

[30]  Chuntian Cheng,et al.  Hydropower curtailment in Yunnan Province, southwestern China: Constraint analysis and suggestions , 2018, Renewable Energy.

[31]  Jin-Hua Xu,et al.  Inter-regional power grid planning up to 2030 in China considering renewable energy development and regional pollutant control: A multi-region bottom-up optimization model , 2016 .

[32]  Pablo T. Spiller,et al.  The Institutions of Regulation: An Application to Public Utilities , 2008 .

[33]  Gregory C. Unruh Escaping carbon lock-in , 2002 .

[34]  Michel Ghertman,et al.  Regulation, Deregulation and Reregulation: Institutional Perspectives , 2009 .

[35]  Fredrich Kahrl,et al.  The political economy of electricity dispatch reform in China , 2013 .

[36]  Iain Staffell,et al.  Levelised Value of Electricity - A Systemic Approach to Technology Valuation , 2016 .

[37]  Yanlong Hu,et al.  Cause analysis and policy options for the surplus hydropower in southwest China based on quantification , 2018 .

[38]  Luiz Fernando Rangel,et al.  Competition policy and regulation in hydro-dominated electricity markets , 2008 .

[39]  Chi-Keung Woo,et al.  Electricity market reform failures: UK, Norway, Alberta and California , 2003 .

[40]  F. Menezes,et al.  Regulatory incentives for a low-carbon electricity sector in China , 2018, Journal of Cleaner Production.

[41]  Paulina Jaramillo,et al.  Evaluation of a proposal for reliable low-cost grid power with 100% wind, water, and solar , 2017, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

[42]  Chuntian Cheng,et al.  China׳s small hydropower and its dispatching management , 2015 .

[43]  P. Gao,et al.  Integrating environmental considerations into economic regulation of China's electricity sector , 2016 .

[44]  Gregory C. Unruh Understanding carbon lock-in , 2000 .

[45]  R. Coase The Nature of the Firm , 1937 .

[46]  Paul L. Joskow,et al.  Lessons Learned From Electricity Market Liberalization , 2008 .

[47]  Q. Wang,et al.  China's electricity market-oriented reform: From an absolute to a relative monopoly , 2012 .

[48]  Zhongxiang Zhang Are China's climate commitments in a post‐Paris agreement sufficiently ambitious? , 2016 .

[49]  Zhu Tianxing,et al.  The Relationship between Electricity Consumption and Economic Growth in China , 2012 .

[50]  D. Biggar Is Protecting Sunk Investments by Consumers a Key Rationale for Natural Monopoly Regulation? , 2009 .

[51]  T. Uebel Incommensurability, ecology, and planning: Neurath in the socialist calculation debate, 1919-1928 , 2005 .

[52]  Chuntian Cheng,et al.  China’s Booming Hydropower: Systems Modeling Challenges and Opportunities , 2017 .

[53]  Pei Liu,et al.  A multi-regional modelling and optimization approach to China's power generation and transmission planning , 2016 .

[54]  J. Laffont,et al.  A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation , 1993 .

[55]  Li Yang,et al.  Evolution of China’s power dispatch principle and the new energy saving power dispatch policy , 2010 .

[56]  Peter Cramton,et al.  Electricity market design: the good, the bad, and the ugly , 2003, 36th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2003. Proceedings of the.