Mixed-Initiative Optimization in Security Games: A Preliminary Report

Stackelberg games have been widely used to model patrolling or monitoring problems in security. In a Stackelberg security game, the defender commits to a strategy and the adversary makes its decision with knowledge of the leader’s commitment. Algorithms for computing the defender’s optimal strategy are used in deployed decision-support tools in use by the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), the Federal Air Marshals Service, and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Those algorithms take into account various resource usage constraints defined by human users. However, those constraints may lead to poor (even infeasible) solutions due to users’ insufficient information and bounded rationality. A mixed-initiative approach, in which human users and software assistants (agents) collaborate to make security decisions, is needed. Efficient human-agent interaction process leads to models with higher overall solution quality. This paper preliminarily analyzes the needs and challenges for such a mixed-initiative approach.