Network routing for insurgency: An adversarial risk analysis framework

Problems in counterterrorism and corporate competition have prompted research that attempts to combine statistical risk analysis with game theory in ways that support practical decision making. This article applies these methods of adversarial risk analysis to the problem of selecting a route through a network in which an opponent chooses vertices for ambush. The motivating application is convoy routing across a road network when there may be improvised explosive devices and imperfect intelligence about their locations. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011

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