Applying the principle of common but differentiated responsibility to the mitigation of greenhouse gases from international shipping

The report discusses options for reconciling the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR) with IMO's principle of equal treatment of ships when creating a marked-based measure for curbing CO2 emissions from international shipping. Global application with revenues used for compensating the developing countries (no net incidence) is the most obvious option. Another possibility is to provide a grace period for emissions from ships on route to non-Annex I countries by restricting the application of a market-based measure to emissions caused by ships on journey to ports in the rich countries. The geographical coverage of such a scheme could gradually widen as non- Annex I countries become more economically advanced. Among the issues that need to be clarified are the exact grounds for compensation. The basic choice is between distinct categories (Annex I or non-Annex I) and parametric values such as CO2/capita and GDP/capita. Another main issue is the duration of the compensation rules. Some non-Annex I countries have already passed the least developed Annex I countries in terms of GDP per capita and/or emissions per capita. It may be a good idea to establish an expert group, as proposed by China and India, to look into the details of how to apply CBDR to the reduction of emissions from international shipping, including the longer term implications.

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