Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations

This paper studies the problem of allocating divisible resources among agents based on their characteristics. A simple example is the bankruptcy problem, which allocates the liquidation value of a bankrupted firm to creditors based on their claims. By allowing agents' characteristics to be multi-dimensional and varying the meaning of variables in the model, our model subsumes a number of existing and new alloca- tion problems, such as the problems of cost sharing, social choice under transferable utilities, income redistribution, bankruptcy with multiple assets, probability updat- ing, and probability aggregation. We characterize allocation rules under which no group of agents can increase the total amount they receive by transferring their characteristics within the group. A number of existing and new results in specific problems are obtained as corollaries.

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