Payoff information and learning in signaling games
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] E. Vandamme. Stability and perfection of nash equilibria , 1987 .
[2] E. Damme. Stability and perfection of Nash equilibria , 1987 .
[3] David M. Kreps,et al. Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria , 1987 .
[4] J. Sobel,et al. Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games , 1987 .
[5] D. Fudenberg,et al. Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium , 1999 .
[6] Ignacio Esponda,et al. Berk-Nash Equilibrium: A Framework for Modeling Agents with Misspecified Models , 2014, 1411.1152.
[7] D. Fudenberg,et al. Steady state learning and Nash equilibrium , 1993 .
[8] E. Kalai,et al. Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium , 1993 .
[9] Drew Fudenberg,et al. Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs , 2018, Games Econ. Behav..
[10] D. Fudenberg,et al. Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games , 2017, 1702.01819.
[11] D. Fudenberg,et al. Rationalizable Partition-Confirmed Equilibrium , 2015 .
[12] David M. Kreps,et al. Learning Mixed Equilibria , 1993 .
[13] Lars Stole,et al. Fixed-equilibrium rationalizability in signaling games , 1990 .
[14] J. Mertens,et al. ON THE STRATEGIC STABILITY OF EQUILIBRIA , 1986 .
[15] D. Fudenberg,et al. Superstition and Rational Learning , 2006 .