Assumptions of subjective measures of unconscious mental states: higher order thoughts and bias

This paper considers two subjective measures of the existence of unconscious mental states - the guessing criterion, and the zero correlation criterion - and considers the assumptions underlying their application in experimental paradigms. Using higher order thought theory (Rosenthal, e.g. 1986; 1995) the impact of different types of biases oil the zero correlation and guessing criteria are considered. It is argued that subjective measures of consciousness call be biased in various specified ways, some of which involve the relation between first order states and second order thoughts, and hence are not errors in measurement of the conscious status of mental states; but other sorts of biases are measurement errors, involving the relation between higher order thoughts and their expression. Nonetheless, it is argued this type of bias does not preclude subjective measures - both the guessing criterion and the zero correlation criterion - as being amongst the most appropriate and useful tools for measuring the conscious status of mental states.

[1]  Rocco J. Gennaro.  Higher-order theories of consciousness : an anthology , 2004 .

[2]  Josef Perner,et al.  Assumptions of a subjective measure of consciousness: Three mappings , 2004 .

[3]  David R. Shanks,et al.  Subjective measures of awareness and implicit cognition , 2003, Memory & cognition.

[4]  E. Hunt.  Adaptive Thinking: Rationality in the Real World. By Gerd Gigerenzer. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000. ISBN 0195136225. , 2003 .

[5]  Josef Perner,et al.  Unifying consciousness with explicit knowledge , 2003 .

[6]  Shelley Channon,et al.  Is implicit learning spared in amnesia? Rule abstraction and item familiarity in artificial grammar learning , 2002, Neuropsychologia.

[7]  P. Carruthers.  The cognitive functions of language , 2002, Behavioral and Brain Sciences.

[8]  Josef Perner,et al.  The Metacognitive Implications of the Implicit-Explicit Distinction , 2002 .

[9]  Josef Perner,et al.  A theory of the implicit nature of implicit learning , 2002 .

[10]  B. Newell,et al.  Well past midnight: Calling time on implicit invariant learning? , 2002 .

[11]  T. Ruffman,et al.  Does eye gaze indicate implicit knowledge of false belief? Charting transitions in knowledge. , 2001, Journal of experimental child psychology.

[12]  H. Pashler,et al.  Confidence and Accuracy of Near-Threshold Discrimination Responses , 2001, Consciousness and Cognition.

[13]  Mark Rowlands,et al.  Consciousness and Higher‐Order Thoughts , 2001 .

[14]  R. Tunney,et al.  Two modes of transfer in artificial grammar learning. , 2001, Journal of experimental psychology. Learning, memory, and cognition.

[15]  N. Block.  Paradox and cross purposes in recent work on consciousness , 2001, Cognition.

[16]  A M Burton,et al.  Incidental Learning of Real-World Regularities , 2001, Psychological science.

[17]  Twyman Ms,et al.  Metacognitive measures of implicit knowledge. , 2001 .

[18]  Z. Dienes,et al.  When knowledge is unconscious because of conscious knowledge and vice versa , 2001 .

[19]  J. Miller,et al.  Measurement error in subliminal perception experiments: simulation analyses of two regression methods. , 2000, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance.

[20]  Carl Martin Allwood,et al.  Realism in confidence judgements of performance based on implicit learning. , 2000 .

[21]  D. Rosenthal.  Metacognition and Higher-Order Thoughts , 2000, Consciousness and Cognition.

[22]  D. Rosenthal.  Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments , 2000, Consciousness and Cognition.

[23]  Z. Dienes,et al.  A theory of implicit and explicit knowledge , 1999, Behavioral and Brain Sciences.

[24]  Z. Dienes,et al.  Higher order thinking , 1999, Behavioral and Brain Sciences.

[25]  L. Weiskrantz,et al.  Awareness and confidence ratings in motion perception without geniculo-striate projection , 1998, Behavioural Brain Research.

[26]  Josef Perner,et al.  Language and thought: The meta-intentional nature of executive functions and theory of mind , 1998 .

[27]  A. Cowey,et al.  Is blindsight like normal, near-threshold vision? , 1997, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.

[28]  Zoltán Dienes,et al.  Transfer of implicit knowledge across domains? How implicit and how abstract? , 1997 .

[29]  Philip M. Merikle,et al.  Parallels between Perception without Attention and Perception without Awareness , 1997, Consciousness and Cognition.

[30]  Z. Dienes,et al.  Implicit learning: Below the subjective threshold , 1997 .

[31]  Geraint Rees,et al.  Consciousness lost and found , 1997 .

[32]  Regina Bernhaupt,et al.  Application of implicit knowledge: deterministic or probabilistic? , 1997 .

[33]  T. O. Nelson.  Consciousness and metacognition. , 1996 .

[34]  Peter Carruthers,et al.  Language, thought, and consciousness , 1996 .

[35]  Axel Cleeremans,et al.  Comparing direct and indirect measures of implicit learning , 1996 .

[36]  Nick Chater,et al.  Confidence judgements, performance, and practice, in artificial grammar learning , 1996 .

[37]  Jochen Braun,et al.  Blindsight in normal observers , 1995, Nature.

[38]  Z. Dienes,et al.  UNCONSCIOUS KNOWLEDGE OF ARTIFICIAL GRAMMARS IS APPLIED STRATEGICALLY , 1995 .

[39]  A. Greenwald,et al.  Activation by marginally perceptible ("subliminal") stimuli: dissociation of unconscious from conscious cognition. , 1995, Journal of experimental psychology. General.

[40]  A. Cowey,et al.  Blindsight in monkeys , 1995, Nature.

[41]  D. Shanks,et al.  Characteristics of dissociable human learning systems , 1994, Behavioral and Brain Sciences.

[42]  Carol A. Seger,et al.  Implicit learning. , 1994, Psychological bulletin.

[43]  Dianne C. Berry,et al.  Implicit Learning , 1993 .

[44]  A. Marcel,et al.  Slippage in the unity of consciousness. , 1993, Ciba Foundation symposium.

[45]  B. Kosko.  Fuzzy Thinking: The New Science of Fuzzy Logic , 1993 .

[46]  A. Reber.  Implicit learning and tacit knowledge , 1993 .

[47]  R. Kirk,et al.  Consciousness and Concepts , 1992 .

[48]  R. Ratcliff,et al.  Inference during reading. , 1992, Psychological review.

[49]  P. Merikle,et al.  Perception without awareness. Critical issues. , 1992, The American psychologist.

[50]  D. Dennett,et al.  The Nature of Consciousness , 2006 .

[51]  Cheng Chan,et al.  Implicit cognitive processes : theoretical issues and applications in computer systems design , 1991 .

[52]  E. Reingold,et al.  Theory and measurement in the study of unconscious processes , 1990 .

[53]  K. Ruddock.  Blindsight: a case study and implications. Oxford Psychology Series No 12. , 1987 .

[54]  P. Merikle,et al.  Distinguishing conscious from unconscious perceptual processes. , 1986, Canadian journal of psychology.

[55]  D. Rosenthal.  Two concepts of consciousness , 1986 .

[56]  L. Weiskrantz.  Blindsight : a case study and implications , 1986 .

[57]  R. Kirk.  Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories , 1985 .

[58]  P. Merikle,et al.  Priming with and without awareness , 1984, Perception & psychophysics.

[59]  Alf Zimmer,et al.  Verbal Vs. Numerical Processing of Subjective Probabilities , 1983 .

[60]  D. Armstrong,et al.  The Nature of Mind and Other Essays , 1983 .

[61]  B. Fischhoff,et al.  Reasons for confidence. , 1980 .

[62]  I. Lakatos.  Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes , 1976 .

[63]  C. Eriksen,et al.  Discrimination and learning without awareness: a methodological survey and evaluation. , 1960, Psychological review.

[64]  J. Jastrow,et al.  On small differences in sensation , 1884 .