Supermodularity and Convergence: An Experimental Study of the Compensation Mechanism ⁄

∗We thank James Andreoni, Charles Brown, David Cooper, Daniel Houser and Peter Katuscak for helpful conversations, seminar participants at Michigan, Virginia Tech, ESA 2001 (Barcelona and Tucson) for their comments, Emre Sucu for programming for the experiment, Yuri Khoroshilov, Jim Leady and Belal Sabki for excellent research assistance. The research support provided by NSF grant SES-0079001 to Chen is gratefully acknowledged. Any remaining errors are our own.

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