Guaranteed renewability uniquely prevents adverse selection in individual health insurance
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Howard Kunreuther | Mark V. Pauly | H. Kunreuther | M. Pauly | R. Hirth | Kai Menzel | Richard A. Hirth | Kai Menzel
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