Specialization versus diversification as a venture capital investment strategy

Abstract Much important work has informed us of rates of return earned by venture capitalists, the importance of venture capitalists to the “going public” process, and the criteria venture capitalists use to evaluate deals. This paper seeks to add to the literature by testing hypotheses, based upon both the finance and strategic management literature, regarding certain venture capitalist investment practices. Venture capitalists seek to control or manage risk (Driscoll 1974; MacMillan, Siegel, and SubbaNarasimha 1985). Financing structure and investment strategy provide several means for venture capitalists to do this. Tools available to the venture capitalist include portfolio diversification to spread risk across different industries, firms, or hot/cold IPO markets to minimize unsystematic or investment-specific risk. Information sharing, networking, and specialization can also be used to control unsystematic risk. Several hypotheses are developed from these conflicting perspectives. Data used to test the hypotheses are derived from responses to a survey of venture capitalists. Three hundred surveys were mailed to venture capitalists; 98, or 32.7%,returned usable responses. Portfolio diversification is a well-known means to control risk exposure by reducing unsystematic or specific risks. However, Bygrave (1987, 1988), as well as financial intermediation theorists, argues that maintaining a high degree of specialization is useful for controlling risk as well as for gaining access to networks, information, and deal flow from other venture investors. The analyses of this paper build upon Bygrave's work. We construct more rigorous tests to resolve the conflict between the diversification and information-sharing hypotheses. Our hypothesis tests were usually resolved in favor of the information-sharing view. For example, venture capitalists in the sample that were heavily involved in seed round financing were diversified across fewer numbers of firms and industries. Further evidence in favor of information sharing is seen in investment patterns across different financing stages. Diversification would imply maintaining a portfolio of investments across the different investment stages. The information sharing/specialization view would argue that it is best to stay focused on a single stage or several “connected” stages. The empirical evidence from the sample once again favors the specialization perspective. This research provides information of use to venture capitalists, as they seek information on how best to control risk; to entrepreneurs, as they learn of the factors venture capitalists consider in determining their investment strategy; and to academicians, as such studies provide insight to general industry practice and thus help to form the basis of classroom discussion and future research endeavors.

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