Simple Mechanisms for a Subadditive Buyer and Applications to Revenue Monotonicity
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi,et al. Revenue Maximization for Selling Multiple Correlated Items , 2014, ESA.
[2] Aviad Rubinstein. On the Computational Complexity of Optimal Simple Mechanisms , 2016, ITCS.
[3] Yang Cai,et al. A duality-based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design , 2016, SECO.
[4] Shuchi Chawla,et al. Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations , 2007, EC '07.
[5] S. Matthew Weinberg,et al. Symmetries and optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design , 2012, EC '12.
[6] Robert D. Kleinberg,et al. Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings , 2011, SODA '11.
[7] G. Pavlov,et al. A Property of Solutions to Linear Monopoly Problems , 2011 .
[8] Xiaohui Bei,et al. Bayesian incentive compatibility via fractional assignments , 2010, SODA '11.
[9] S. Matthew Weinberg,et al. Matroid prophet inequalities , 2012, STOC '12.
[10] Yang Cai,et al. Understanding Incentives: Mechanism Design Becomes Algorithm Design , 2013, 2013 IEEE 54th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science.
[11] G. Schechtman. Chapter 37 - Concentration, Results and Applications , 2003 .
[12] Michal Feldman,et al. Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices , 2014, SODA.
[13] Andrew Chi-Chih Yao,et al. On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items , 2013, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
[14] Jason D. Hartline. Approximation in mechanism design , 2010, BQGT.
[15] Shuchi Chawla,et al. The power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design , 2010, EC '10.
[16] David Simchi-Levi,et al. Reaping the Benefits of Bundling under High Production Costs , 2015, AISTATS.
[17] John Thanassoulis,et al. Haggling over substitutes , 2004, J. Econ. Theory.
[18] R. Zeckhauser,et al. Optimal Selling Strategies: When to Haggle, When to Hold Firm , 1983 .
[19] Sahil Singla,et al. Combinatorial Prophet Inequalities , 2016, SODA.
[20] Christos Tzamos,et al. The Complexity of Optimal Mechanism Design , 2012, SODA.
[21] Roger B. Myerson,et al. Optimal Auction Design , 1981, Math. Oper. Res..
[22] S. Matthew Weinberg,et al. A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements: Abstract , 2016, EC.
[23] S. Matthew Weinberg,et al. A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer , 2014, 2014 IEEE 55th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science.
[24] Yang Cai,et al. Simple and Nearly Optimal Multi-Item Auctions , 2012, SODA.
[25] Shuchi Chawla,et al. Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing , 2010, BQGT.
[26] Yang Cai,et al. Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality , 2016, STOC.
[27] Shuchi Chawla,et al. Mechanism Design for Subadditive Agents via an Ex Ante Relaxation , 2016, EC.
[28] Christos H. Papadimitriou,et al. On the Complexity of Dynamic Mechanism Design , 2014, SODA.
[29] Noam Nisan,et al. The menu-size complexity of auctions , 2013, EC '13.
[30] S. Hart,et al. Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations , 2015 .
[31] Xi Chen,et al. The Complexity of Optimal Multidimensional Pricing , 2013, SODA.
[32] Jason D. Hartline. Approximation and Mechanism Design , 2010 .
[33] Andrew Chi-Chih Yao,et al. An n-to-1 Bidder Reduction for Multi-item Auctions and its Applications , 2014, SODA.
[34] S. Matthew Weinberg,et al. Pricing randomized allocations , 2009, SODA '10.