The role of generally accepted reporting methods in the public sector: An empirical test

Abstract This study explores the role of standard or generally accepted accounting and reporting methods in the public sector. It differs from prior studies that address public sector accounting issues in that it considers more directly how the political process influences decisions to report financial information. The primary contention is that adopting standard reporting methods reduces costs to public officials that arise from factors that characterize political markets. Empirical evidence based on data from the state governments is consistent with this contention, but theoretical and methodological problems restrict our ability to ascertain which specific factors are relevant.

[1]  D. Pfeiffer The Measurement of Inter-Party Competition and Systemic Stability , 1967, American Political Science Review.

[2]  R. Ingram The importance of state accounting practices for creditor decisions , 1983 .

[3]  Richard I. Hofferbert The Study of public policy , 1974 .

[4]  G. Stigler The Theory of Economic Regulation , 2021, The Political Economy.

[5]  Ross L. Watts,et al.  Corporate Financial Statements, A Product of the Market and Political Processes , 1977 .

[6]  T. Amemiya QUALITATIVE RESPONSE MODELS: A SURVEY , 1981 .

[7]  R. McKelvey,et al.  A statistical model for the analysis of ordinal level dependent variables , 1975 .

[8]  R. Tollison,et al.  Politicians, Legislation, and the Economy: An Inquiry into the Interest-Group Theory of Government , 1981 .

[9]  Jerold L. Zimmerman,et al.  MUNICIPAL ACCOUNTING MAZE - ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL INCENTIVES , 1977 .

[10]  Robert W. Ingram,et al.  Economic Incentives and the Choice of State Government Accounting Practices , 1984 .

[11]  George J. Stigler,et al.  Economic competition and political competition , 1972 .

[12]  J. M. Patton,et al.  An economic analysis of participation in the municipal finance officers association certificate of conformance program , 1983 .

[13]  Sidney Davidson,et al.  Financial Reporting by State and Local Government Units , 1977 .

[14]  M. C. Jensen,et al.  THEORY OF THE FIRM: MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR, AGENCY COSTS AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE , 1976 .

[15]  G. Stigler,et al.  Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers , 1974, The Journal of Legal Studies.

[16]  Lawrence A. Gordon,et al.  GASB's Survival Potential: An Agency Theory Perspective , 1983 .

[17]  R. Barro The control of politicians: An economic model , 1973 .

[18]  Douglas Nelson,et al.  The political economy of administered protection , 1982 .