Analysis of Equilibria in Iterative Voting Schemes

Following recent studies of iterative voting and its effects on plurality vote outcomes, we provide characterisations and complexity results for three models of iterative voting under the plurality rule. Our focus is on providing a better understanding regarding the set of equilibria attainable by iterative voting processes. We start with the basic model of plurality voting. We first establish some useful properties of equilibria, reachable by iterative voting, which enable us to show that deciding whether a given profile is an iteratively reachable equilibrium is NP-complete. We then proceed to combine iterative voting with the concept of truth bias, a model where voters prefer to be truthful when they cannot affect the outcome. We fully characterise the set of attainable truth-biased equilibria, and show that it is possible to determine all such equilibria in polynomial time. Finally, we also examine the model of lazy voters, in which a voter may choose to abstain from the election. We establish convergence of the iterative process, albeit not necessarily to a Nash equilibrium. As in the case with truth bias, we also provide a polynomial time algorithm to find all the attainable equilibria.

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