THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE CHILEAN TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

Chile’s economic performance since the mid 1990s has been outstanding. Several reasons account for this success. The strong initial position of the economy was a crucial asset. Broad consensus on economic matters helped a lot. This paper argues that the i

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