论文信息 - Copeland Method II: Manipulation, Monotonicity, and Paradoxes☆

Copeland Method II: Manipulation, Monotonicity, and Paradoxes☆

Abstract An important issue for economics and the decision sciences is to understand why allocation and decision procedures are plagued by manipulative and paradoxical behavior once there are n ⩾3 alternatives. Valuable insight is obtained by exploiting the relative simplicity of the widely used Copeland method (CM). By using a geometric approach, we characterize all CM manipulation, monotonicity, consistency, and involvement properties while identifying all profiles which are susceptible to these difficulties. For instance, we show for n =3 candidates that the CM minimizes the negative aspects of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D71, C60.

Donald G. Saari | Vincent Merlin | D. Saari | V. Merlin

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