The Value of Research Based on Simple Assumptions about Voters’ Preferences

Many people have found it to be very interesting to think about strange and counterintuitive outcomes that might possibly be observed when a group of voters takes on the task of selecting a winning candidate from a set of available candidates. Books have been written to describe many of these paradoxical outcomes and to categorize them according to the types of unusual behaviors that they display. The categories of voting paradoxes that are defined by Nurmi (1999) are used in this current study.

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